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1. Introduction 
 
“In a trade English capital is instantly at the disposal of persons capable of 
understanding the new opportunities and making good use of them. In countries 
where there is little money to lend enterprising traders are long kept back, 
because they cannot at once borrow the capital, without which skill and 
knowledge are useless.”     
Bagehot, 1873. 
 
The past decade was marked by the increasing role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in total 
capital flows (See Table 1). In 1998, FDI accounted for more than half of all private capital flows 
to developing countries.
1  This change in the composition of capital flows has been synchronous 
with a shift in emphasis among policymakers in developing countries to attract more FDI, 
especially following the 1980s debt crisis and the recent turmoil in  emerging economies. The 
rationale for increased efforts to attract more FDI stems from the belief that FDI has several 
positive effects which include  productivity gains, technology transfers, the introduction of new 
processes, managerial skills, and k now-how  in  the domestic market, employee training, 
international production networks, and access to markets.
2 
If foreign firms introduce new products or processes to the domestic market, domestic firms 
may benefit from accelerated diffusion of new technology. In other  situations, technology 
diffusion might occur from labor turnover as domestic employees move from foreign to domestic 
firms. These benefits, in addition to the direct capital financing it generates, suggest that FDI can 
play an important role in modernizing the national economy and promoting growth.
3 Based on 
these arguments, governments often have provided special incentives to foreign firms to set up 
companies in their country.  
Yet, curiously, the empirical evidence of these benefits both at the firm level and at the 
national level remains ambiguous. For example, looking at plant level data in Venezuela, Aitken 
and Harrison (1999) find that the net effect of FDI on productivity is quite small￿ FDI raises 
productivity within plants that receive the investment but lowers that of domestically owned 
plants￿ thus seriously putting in doubt the “spillover” theory. At the macroeconomic level,   3 
growth regressions carried out by Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) and Carkovic and 
Levine (2000) find little support that FDI has an exogenous positive effect on economic growth.  
While it   may seem natural to argue that FDI can convey greater knowledge spillovers, a 
country's capacity to take advantage of these externalities might be limited by local conditions. In 
an effort to further examine the effects of FDI on economic growth, our research takes its cue 
from the recent emphasis on the role of institutions in the growth literature. In particular, we 
emphasize the role of financial institutions and argue that the lack of development of local 
financial markets can limit the economy's ability to take advantage of potential FDI spillovers.  
Schumpeter recognized the importance of well-developed financial intermediaries in 
enhancing technological innovation, capital accumulation, and economic growth almost a century 
ago. In a nutshell, the argument goes that well-functioning financial markets, by lowering costs of 
conducting transactions, ensure capital is allocated to the projects that yield the highest returns, 
and therefore enhances growth rates. Well-known early protagonists of this view include 
Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973).
4 
Although  most FDI by its very nature relies on capital from abroad, it is important to 
recognize that the spillovers for the host economy might crucially depend  on the extent of the 
development of domestic financial markets. There are different ways in which financial markets 
matter. First, it is unlikely that spillovers are restricted to only costless improvements in the 
organization of the workforce. In particular, to take advantage of the new knowledge, local firms 
need to alter everyday activities and, more generally, reorganize their structure,  buy  new 
machines, and hire new managers and skilled labor. Although some local firms might be able to 
finance  new requirements with internal financing, the greater the technological-knowledge gap 
between their current practices and new technologies, the greater the need for external finance. In 
most cases, external finance is restricted to domestic sources. Furthermore, the lack of financial 
markets also can constrain potential entrepreneurs. This is especially true when the arrival of an 
entirely new technology brings with it the potential to tap not just domestic markets but export   4 
markets. An excellent case in point is the emergence of the textile export industry in Bangladesh 
in the early 1980s, following the  establishment of a textile plant by Daewoo in 1979. Of the 130 
Bangladeshi workers who  were  trained in Korea to become familiar with the technology, 115 
eventually left to set up their own garment export plants.
5 It is difficult to imagine that all these 
workers managed to finance factories with their own cash. Had loans not been forthcoming to 
finance their enterprises and many more export industries that  followed, it is unlikely that 
garment exports from Bangladesh would have increased  from $55,000 in 1980 to $2 billion in 
two decades.
6,7   
In addition, the  potential of FDI t o  create backward linkages, in the  absence of well-
developed financial markets, is severely impeded. The importance of linkages that multinationals 
can create spawned a huge empirical literature following Albert Hirschman’s (1958) seminal 
book on this topic.
8  Even though  backward linkages may allow existing firms, which  already 
produce inputs in the industry, to achieve economies of scale that may not have existed earlier, it 
also can encourage the creation of new firms.  
An excellent example is the involvement of Suzuki in India. Suzuki entered into a joint 
venture with the Government of India in 1981 to manufacture small-sized affordable cars. 
Initially, all the car’s parts were imported from Japan. Within ten years, the plant had become the 
center of gravity of scores of ancillary parts manufacturers that did not exist earlier. Today, these 
suppliers provide 90% of  a  car’s parts.
9 Without  external financing, it is unlikely that these 
manufacturers  would  have emerged. In similar vein, following  Intel’s construction of a 
semiconductor assembly plant in Costa Rica in 1996, local software production in Costa Rica 
increased dramatically. Evidence indicates that the sector benefited from newly created training 
programs in higher education institutions  that have become “Intel Associates.” However, 
producers and potential entrepreneurs in the software sector continuously complain that a lack of 
funds and/or the high cost of available financing hinder the growth of the sector and its ability to 
compete in the international arena.
10   5 
The preceding arguments and anecdotes illustrate the significant role financial markets play 
in allowing spillovers and linkages associated with FDI to materialize. Furthermore, to the extent 
that  significant FDI arrives through mergers and acquisitions,  it is  not just easy availability of 
loans but also well-functioning s tock markets that matter. Well-functioning stock markets, by 
increasing the spectrum of sources of finance for entrepreneurs, play an important role in creating 
linkages between domestic and foreign investors. To summarize, one can  conjecture that the 
extent of development of financial institutions may be a decisive factor in determining whether 
foreign firms operate in isolated enclaves with no links whatsoever with the domestic economy 
(beyond hiring labor). Or, whether they become the catalysts for technology transfers and other 
benefits that economists long have  argued these firms should be. 
Despite this rather obvious role for financial markets, the literature on FDI seems to have 
ignored its importance altogether. In fact, the role of not just financial markets but other factors, 
such as potential shortages of skills, knowledge, and infrastructure in the recipient countries, have 
been neglected in the development literature. Caves (1999) notes that the four volumes of The 
Handbook of Development Economics have nothing to say about the kind of constraints local 
firms might face to reap  such spillovers. Only recently have such issues been addressed. For 
example, Borensztein et al. (1998), using a data set of FDI flows from industrialized countries to 
69 developing countries, show that FDI allows for transferring technology and for higher growth. 
However, higher productivity is possible  only  when the host country has a minimum threshold 
stock of human capital. Likewise, Xu (2000), using data on U .S. multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), finds that a country needs to reach a minimum human capital threshold  in order to 
benefit from the technology transfer of U .S. MNEs, and that most LDCs do not meet this  
threshold.    The World Bank’s 2001 edition of global development finance talks about the 
importance of “absorptive capacities” and the success of FDI.
11 Absorptive capacities here 
include macroeconomic management (as captured by inflation and trade openness), infrastructure 
(telephone lines and paved r oads), and human capital (share of labor force with secondary   6 
education and percentage of population with access to sanitation).  Financial markets are not 
mentioned.  
Although  the empirical evidence on FDI and economic growth is ambiguous, the interaction 
between financial markets and growth itself has been studied extensively and has reached more 
positive conclusions￿namely, that well-developed financial markets promote economic growth. 
The theoretical framework has been well established in the literature with supporting evidence at 
the country level reported in the empirical studies such as those of  King and Levine (1993a, 
1993b), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), suggesting that 
financial systems are important for productivity growth and development. 
In an analysis of  the roles of different types of financial institutions, Levine and Zervos 
(1998) show that stock markets and banks provide different services, but both stock market 
liquidity and banking development positively predict growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity improvements. At the industry level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that the state of 
financial development reduces the cost of external finance to firms, thereby promoting growth. 
Combining industry and country level data, Wurgler (2000) shows that even if financial 
development does not lead to higher levels of investment, it seems to allocate the existing 
investment better and hence promotes  economic growth.  
Figure 1 , which shows data on FDI and financial development, provides motivation  for our 
work. We use FDI as a share of GDP and a measure of financial development introduced by Beck 
et al. (2000)  for the period 1975-1995. As figure 1  suggests, there is a positive relationship 
between the two variables. However, it is also apparent that there is a wide variation in both 
variables given their interaction with one  another.  Indeed, if financial development plays an 
important role in influencing the effects of FDI on output, one can expect countries with the same 
levels of FDI to have very different outcomes in terms of income levels. 
In this paper, we examine whether economies with better-developed financial markets are 
able to benefit from FDI to promote their economic growth. To do this, we use a battery of   7 
financial market variables that exist in the literature and employ them in growth regressions to 
study the impact of the interaction of these variables with FDI on economic growth. We find that, 
although  FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in contributing to economic growth, having well-
developed financial markets alters the results significantly. This is consistent with the results of 
Carkovic and Levine (2000). Countries with well-developed financial markets seem to gain 
significantly more from FDI. We find that this result holds true even after controlling for a large 
number of other variables that have significant influences on economic growth and also after 
addressing concerns regarding endogeneity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: data are defined in section 2; empirical results 
are discussed in section 3; and section 4 concludes the discussion. 
2  Data 
This section describes the data used in the empirical analysis, specifically the measures of 
FDI, financial market development, economic growth, and a number of controlling variables used 
in growth regressions. 
There are several sources for data on FDI. An important source is the IMF publication 
“International Financial Statistics” (IFS) (2000), which reports the Balance of Payments statistics 
on FDI. Net FDI inflows, reported in the IFS, measure the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Gross FDI 
figures reflect the sum of the absolute value of inflows and outflows accounted in the balance of 
payments financial accounts. Our model focuses on the inflows to the economy; therefore, we 
prefer using the net inflow measure.
12 
 It is very difficult to construct accurate and comparable measures of financial services data 
for a broad cross-section of countries over several decades. King and Levine (1993a), Levine and 
Zervos (1998), and Levine et al. (2000) have constructed several financial market series, spanning   8 
from the stock market to the volume of lending in an economy. These variables can be classified 
into two broad categories: those relating to the banking sector (or loosely, credit markets) and 
those relating to the stock market (or equity markets). For the first set, we draw on variables 
introduced by Levine et al. (2000), which in turn builds on King and Levine (1993a). The data 
associated with the former are available from the World Bank Financial Structure Database.
13 
Four  variables are included in our work.  First,  Liquid Liabilities  of the Financial System 
(henceforth, LLY): equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
nonfinancial intermediaries divided by GDP.  It  is the broadest measure of financial 
intermediation and includes three types of financial institutions: the central bank, deposit money 
banks, and other financial institutions. Hence, LLY provides a measure for the overall size of the 
financial sector without distinguishing between different financial sectors. Second, Commercial-
Central Bank Assets (henceforth, BTOT): equals the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by 
commercial bank plus central bank assets.  BTOT measures the degree to which commercial 
banks versus the central bank allocate society’s savings. King and Levine (1993a) and Levine et 
al. (2000), as well as others, have used this measure, which provides a relative size indicator, i.e., 
the importance of the different financial institutions and sectors relative to each other. Third, 
Private Credit (henceforth, PRIVCR): equals the value of credits by financial intermediaries to 
the private sector divided by GDP. The two previous measures do not differentiate between the 
end users of the claims of financial intermediaries, i.e., whether the claims are in the public or the 
private sector. This measure, and the one following, focuses solely on the claims on the private 
sector.  Fourth, Bank Credit (henceforth, BANKCR): equals the credits by deposit money banks to 
the private sector as a share of GDP (it does not include nonbank credits to the private sector and 
therefore may be less comprehensive than PRIVCR for some countries). The number of countries 
for which we have these financial market variables and FDI shares is 71.
14 
The stock market data consist of variables introduced in Levine and Zervos (1998). Stock 
market liquidity is measured as the value of stock trading relative to the size of the economy,   9 
labeled as “value traded” (henceforth, SVALT). In order to capture the relative size of the stock 
market, we use the average value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges in a year as a 
share of the size of the economy (the GDP). This series is labeled “capitalization” (henceforth, 
SCAPT). The stock market data series are also available from the World Bank Financial Structure 
Database. The restrictiveness of the availability of stock market measures, accompanied by those 
of FDI data, limits the sample size to approximately 50 and also the length of the period to 1980-
1995. The countries included in the various regressions are listed in the data appendix.
15 
Growth rate of output is measured as the growth of real per capita GDP in constant dollars, 
and the data are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2000). Gross domestic 
investment data come from WDI (2000), which consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets 
of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Inflation, measured as the percentage 
change in the GDP deflator, is used as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. The data are from 
WDI (2000).  The institutional stability and quality in the economies are proxied by using data 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a monthly publication of Political Risk 
Services that reports data on the risk of expropriation, level of corruption, the rule of law, and the 
bureaucratic quality in an economy. A detailed description of all the data is included in the Data 
Appendix. 
To capture openness to international trade, we use the ratio of the sum of exports plus imports 
to total output (GDP). Human capital is measured as the “average years of secondary schooling”, 
obtained from Barro and Lee (1996) series.
16 The government consumption data come from the 
WDI (2000) and is the ratio of central government expenditures divided by GDP. Finally, the 
population growth data also are obtained from WDI (2000). 
3  Empirical Analysis 
The first data set, relating to the “credit market indicators” includes 20 OECD countries and 
51 non-OECD countries.  The second data set, concentrating on “ equity market indicators” 
consists of 20 OECD countries and 29 non-OECD countries.
17   10 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for investment, growth, and financial development data. 
There is considerable variation in the share of FDI in GDP across countries, ranging from -0.15% 
in Sierra Leone (1975-1995) to 10% in Singapore (1980-1995). GDP growth also shows 
variation, ranging from  -4% for Guyana to 7% for Korea (both for 1975-1995). The financial 
development variables also range extensively; capitalization of the stock market ranges from 1% 
for Uruguay to 126% for South Africa; value traded ranges from close to 0% for Uruguay to 
130% for Switzerland. Finally, the liquidity measure (M2/GDP) ranges from 16% for Argentina 
to 161% for Japan. The private credit variable ranges from 3% for Ghana to 164% for 
Switzerland. Ghana and Switzerland also form the two ends of the spectrum for the bank credit 
variable. Ghana also has the lowest value for the share of Commercial-Central Bank Assets; 
Austria records the highest.  
3.1   Growth and FDI: Financial Markets as a Channel 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to examine the financial markets channel through 
which FDI may be beneficial for growth. In an influential paper, Mankiw et al. (1992) (MRW) 
derive an empirical specification based on the assumption that countries are unlikely to be at their 
steady states and therefore transitional dynamics should be more important. We employ a 
specification similar to theirs.
18 As a starting exercise, we look at the direct effect of FDI on 
economic growth and estimate the following equation by OLS: 
0123 log() iiiii GROWTHINITIALGDPFDICONTROLS bbbbn =++++                    (1) 
Table 3 presents results based on regressions for the two samples that we have (the larger 
sample of 71 countries for which we have data on all four credit market variables and the smaller 
sample of 49 countries for which we have data on both equity market variables). Columns (1) and 
(3) show results for a selection of control variables that include initial income, human capital, 
population growth, government consumption, and a sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable. For the 
sample of 71 countries, it is clear that FDI is not significant at all, whereas in the smaller sample   11 
it clearly is. The results could be driven by the composition of the two samples; approximately 28 
% of the first sample (column (1)) and approximately 41 % of the second sample (column (3)) 
consist of developed countries.  
 In columns (2) and (4), we have an expanded set of control variables that include the black 
market premium, institutional quality (captured by the ICRG measure called “risk of 
expropriation”), rate of inflation, and trade volume. Now the FDI share no longer is significant in 
either of the samples. This nicely summarizes the problem that exists in the literature: whereas on 
theoretical grounds there is a strong basis for expecting FDI to have a positive role in growth, the 
empirical evidence is fragile, to say the least.
19 This ambiguous effect of FDI is what forms part 
of the motivation for this research. 
 The regressions in Table 4 examine the role of FDI on growth through financial markets. We 
interact FDI with financial markets and use this as a regressor to test for the significance of 
financial markets in enhancing the positive externalities associated with FDI flows. To ensure that 
the interaction term does not proxy for FDI or the level of development of financial markets, both 
of the latter variables were included in the regression independently. Thus, we run the following 
regression: 
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As shown in Table 4 , the interaction term turns out to be positive and significant in all 
columns. Each regression uses a different indicator for financial market development and hence, 
samples may differ from one regression to another. Column (1) uses BTOT, column (2) uses 
BANKCR, column (3) uses LLY, column (4) uses PRIVCR, column (5) uses SCAPT and column 
(6) uses SVALT.
20  The main result is that the interaction term is significant at the 10% level for 
the entire range of financial sector variables  used. Moreover, the interactions with LLY, 
PRIVCR,  and  BANKCR are significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, financial market 
indicators by themselves are insignificant and even negative for the non stock market variables.
21   12 
This may in part be due to the interaction term capturing an important allocation function that the 
financial sector performs – having a well-developed financial sector is a means to an end and not 
an end in itself. Interestingly, the coefficient of FDI displays considerable variation even within 
the same sample of countries as the financial sector variable changes –clearly making the case for 
looking at the range of financial sector variables rather than a few.  Table 4 also reports a) the 
joint significance test of financial markets with the interaction term and b) the joint significance 
test of foreign direct investment with the interaction term. For most financial market variables, 
the tests confirm the importance of both financial markets and FDI. The hypothesis that the 
coefficients of both FDI and the interaction between FDI and financial markets are zero cannot be 
rejected outright at the 10% level only in the case of BTOT and SVALT. Not surprisingly the 
coefficients of the interaction terms in these two regressions also report the lowest t-statistics 
compared to the counterparts in the other columns. The hypothesis that the coefficients of both 
financial markets and the interaction between FDI and financial markets are zero is rejected in all 
regressions. 
To get an estimate of how important the financial sector has been in enhancing the growth 
effects of FDI, one can ask the hypothetical question of how much a one standard d eviation 
increase in the financial development variable would enhance the growth rate of a country 
receiving the mean level of FDI in the sample.
22 If we use the PRIVCR variable (i.e., column (4)), 
it turns out that having better financial markets would have allowed countries to experience an 
annual growth rate increase of 0.60 percentage points during the 20-year period
23.  
An alternative way to see how countries performed is to simply use the estimated coefficients 
for the sample of countries and calculate the net effect of FDI on growth for each country. It turns 
out that most countries actually had a negative effect from FDI.
24 Table 5a lists the distribution of 
the sample in terms of number of countries that benefited and number of countries that actually 
experienced negative growth because of FDI. As can be observed, there is considerable variation 
depending  on which financial market variable we look at. The stock market variables are   13 
particularly disturbing since they suggest that most countries experienced a negative effect due to 
FDI. Of course this might partly be due to the fact that most countries’ stock markets are even 
less developed compared to banks and thereby exaggerating the problem. However, irrespective 
of which financial market variable w e use, there remains the concern that an unusually large 
number of countries seem to experience negative effects. One explanation could be that we have 
forced a linear relationship on what is essentially a non-linear interaction between FDI and 
financial markets.
25 Other than this problem, the results confirm our conjecture that insufficiently 
developed financial institutions can choke the positive effects of FDI. 
Table 5b reports the results of the significance tests of linear combinations of coefficients at 
different levels of financial development. The null hypothesis is that 
0 ) ( 2 1 = · + FINANCE b b  at different levels of “FINANCE”. Therefore, here we report the 
significance of FDI for different values of the financial market variables. As a crude guide, we 
present the results at the minimum, mean and maximum values for each of the six financial 
market variables. As expected, at the lowest levels of financial development, FDI registers strong 
negative effects. This reconfirms the results of Table 5a. From the Table 5b, it is also apparent 
that even countries with levels of financial development equal to the sample average did not 
derive significant positive effects from FDI. In fact, though not significant, the effect of FDI at 
the average level of financial development also remains negative for most of the variables. It is 
only at the maximum level of financial development that the effects of FDI seem to be positive 
and significant. However here too the effects are not strong for at least two financial market 
variables: BTOT and SCAPT. The results for BTOT are in keeping with the failure of the F-test 
for joint significance of variables involving FDI in Table 4. The findings for SCAPT reinforce the 
results for the same variable in Table 5a. 
 The strong positive correlation between the domestic investment ratio and the growth rate of 
an economy is one of the few consistent results to have emerged from the multitude of cross-  14 
country growth regressions that have appeared in the past decade. One could argue that the reason 
FDI appears significant in the above analysis is because the domestic investment ratio was not 
controlled for. Therefore, for further robustness checks, we add domestic investment to the list of 
independent variables, and the results are  reported in Table 6.  Including  domestic investment 
leads to a couple of interesting results. First, the significance of the interaction term increases, 
particularly for BANKCR, BTOT, PRIVCR, and LLY. Only for stock market capitalization does 
the coefficient become less significant. Second, the t-ratio of the FDI term also increases across 
all the columns, though still not always significant. This suggests that  FDI may have positive 
effects over and above its direct role in capital accumulation. In particular, the so-called “positive 
externality” effect may be what is reflected here, though one would need more convincing results 
to come to a firm conclusion. As expected, domestic investment enters significantly in all the 
regressions.
26 A final issue of robustness is about interacting FDI with human capital since this 
term is shown to have a significant positive effect on economic growth in earlier research.
27 
Column (7) reports the results for this regression. While F DI and schooling both register 
significant effects, the interaction between the two does not.  To the contrary of previous findings, 
the interaction term is negative. However, we are using a different human capital variable for a 
slightly different time period and therefore our result may not be comparable with previous 
findings. The interaction between FDI and financial markets (PRIVCR) remains robust. 
3.3  Endogeneity Issues  
So far there has been no discussion of the endogeneity problem. Theoretically it is plausible, 
and also very likely, that both the magnitude of FDI and the efficiency of financial markets 
increase with higher growth rates. This would lead to an overstatement of the effects of each of 
the two variables and their interaction on growth, since we use the average values of these 
variables to estimate the coefficients in Table 4. Thus, we need to construct instruments for both. 
For financial markets, we use variables that are not subject to reverse causality, such as origins of 
a country’s l egal systems and creditor rights. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny   15 
(1998) examine the laws governing investor protection, the enforcement of these laws, and the 
extent of concentration of ownership of shares in firms across countries (more popularly known 
as LLSV variables). They find that countries with different legal histories offer different types of 
legal protection to their investors. Most countries’ legal rules, either through colonialism, 
conquest, or outright borrowing, can be traced to one of four distinct European legal systems: 
English common-law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law. They show 
that countries whose legal rules originate in the common law tradition offer the greatest 
protection to investors. As far as law enforcement is concerned, German  civil law and 
Scandinavian civil law countries emerge superior. The French civil law countries offer, both, the 
weakest legal protection and the worst enforcement. These legal origin variables have been 
increasingly adopted as exogenous determinants of institutional quality in the economic growth 
literature. In particular, given their usefulness in predicting various indicators of investor rights 
and protection, they have been used as instrumental variables for financial market development in 
La Porta et al. (1997), Beck et al. (2000) and Levine et al. (2000). 
In addition to using the legal origin variables, we also use a measure of creditor rights (a 
LLSV variable) as instruments for financial development. We will focus primarily on the legal 
origin variables for two reasons: first, compared to creditor rights, these are less controversial in 
terms of exogeneity￿they are functions of colonization and occupation usually before the second 
half of the twentieth century. Second, as noted by La Porta et al. (1997), the chain of links begins 
with legal origins, which, in turn influence the shareholder and creditor rights, providing a basis 
for financial development. Shareholder rights, creditor rights,  and enforcement of legal-political 
rights variables also have been used to instrument capital market integration in Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Sorensen, and Yosha (1999). They provide strong empirical evidence for an important 
mechanism through which a developed and reliable financial system, backed by a legal 
environment that protects investor rights, enhances specialization in industrial production. Hence,   16 
in addition to the legal origin variables, their study provides a basis for additional instruments for 
financial development such as creditor rights.  
Table 7 reports the results of the IV regressions using legal origin variables and creditor 
rights as instruments for some of the financial sector variables. In columns (1)-(3), the financial 
sector variables PRIVCR, BANKCR, and SCAPT are instrumented by the English and 
Scandinavian legal origin dummy variables. In column (4), the French legal origin variable is 
added to the list of instruments for SCAPT. In column (5), the creditor rights variable also is 
added to the list of instruments (note that it significantly reduces the sample size). All columns 
show that the interaction term is still positive and significant and results are very similar to the 
OLS results in column (1). All of the columns also report the test statistic for no overidentifying 
restrictions to confirm the validity of the instruments.
 28 
Among the few consistently significant determinants of FDI are real exchange rates and 
lagged FDI. Real exchange rates, either through altering relative costs or relative wealth, impact 
the foreign investment decisions of multinational firms. In a model with imperfect capital 
markets, Froot and Stein (1991) link FDI decisions with real exchange rate variations where, for 
example, a depreciation of the domestic currency increases the relative wealth of foreign firms, 
which leads them to increase their investment abroad. Similarly, Blonigen (2001), assuming 
imperfections in the goods market, shows that the real exchange rate influences the relative 
wealth of firms,  thereby  generating foreign investment flows. In the empirical literature, Klein 
and Rosengren (1994) find supporting evidence that the real exchange rate is a significant 
determinant of FDI.  Along these lines, real exchange rate is used as an instrument for FDI in the 
following analysis, where the real effective exchange rate is calculated as the ratio of the local 
price index to the U .S. price index converted to the local currency. Likewise, following the 
evidence provided by Wheeler and Mody (1992) that FDI is self-reinforcing, i.e., that existing 
stock of foreign investment is a significant determinant of current investment decisions, lagged 
FDI is used as an additional instrument for FDI in the following analysis.  This result is further   17 
reinforced in several country level studies in the literature.
29 Columns (6) and (7) control for both 
the endogeneity of FDI and financial market indicators by instrumenting FDI with one-period 
lagged FDI and real exchange rate levels respectively and financial markets with the legal origin 
variables used in column (4). The results continue to support the finding that FDI promotes 
growth through financial markets. The coefficients, however, increase considerably in values 
compared to the earlier OLS results in Table 5. Instrumental variable estimation here corrects for 
classical measurement error, which biases the OLS coefficients to zero. The higher values of the 
coefficients also alter the balance between countries that lose and those that benefit from FDI. For 
example, if we repeat the earlier exercise of figuring out how many countries in the sample 
benefited from FDI but now use the coefficients from column (7) for our original sample of 49 
countries, we find that as many as 20 countries benefited. This is a much higher figure compared 
to our earlier finding that only 5 benefited. 
4    Conclusion 
Following the debt crisis in the 1980s and the recent turmoil in emerging markets in the late 
1990s, developing countries have changed their attitude towards FDI because it is believed that 
FDI can contribute to the development efforts of a country. In general, a multinational firm’s 
decision to extend production to another country is driven by lower costs and higher efficiency 
considerations. From the host country’s perspective though, the benefits of FDI are not restricted 
to improved use of its resources, but also stem from the introduction of new processes to the 
domestic market, learning-by-observing, networks, training of the labor force, and other 
spillovers and externalities. Due to the “growth-development” benefits FDI seems to convey, 
different countries and regions have pursued active policies to attract FDI. Most countries, 
including both developed and emerging nations, have established investment agencies, and have 
policies that include both fiscal and financial incentives to attract FDI as well as others that seek 
to improve the local regulatory environment and the cost of doing business.   18 
Even  though such policies  can be very effective in attracting foreign investment, local 
conditions can limit the potential benefits FDI can provide to the host country by not generating 
benefits that go beyond the “capital” FDI brings and the wages it generates. In this paper, we 
focused, in particular, on the role of local financial markets and the link between FDI and growth. 
We believe that the non development of local financial markets, in particular, can adversely limit 
an  economy's ability to  take  advantage of such potential FDI benefits. Whereas bad financial 
markets may mean that a country is not in a position to cope with unregulated short-term capital 
flows, our work suggests that the full benefits of long-term stable flows also may not be realized 
in the absence of well-functioning financial markets. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that FDI plays an important role in contributing to economic 
growth. However, the level of development of local financial markets is crucial for these positive 
effects to be realized, and to the best of our knowledge this has not been shown before. We also 
provide evidence that the link between FDI and growth is causal, where FDI promotes growth 
through financial markets. The result of this paper suggests that countries should weigh the cost 
of policies aimed at attracting FDI versus those that seek to improve local conditions. These two 
policies need not be incompatible. Better local conditions not only attract foreign companies but 
also allow host economies to maximize the benefits of foreign investments. 
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Data Appendix 
A2.1 Countries in the Samples 
1.  Sample of 71 countries for which data on credit markets are available (BANKCR, BTOT, 
PRIVCR, LLY). 
2.  Sample of 49 countries for which data on SCAPT and SVALT are available. 
3.  Sample of 53 countries for which SVALT was available but SCAPT was not: Sample of 
49 plus Costa Rica, Honduras, Ireland, and Panama. 
 
List: Algeria (1), Argentina (1,2), Australia (1,2), Austria (1,2), Bangladesh (2), Belgium (1,2), 
Bolivia (1), Brazil (1,2), Cameroon (1), Canada (1,2), Chile (1,2), Colombia (1,2), Congo (1), 
Costa Rica (1), Cyprus (1,2), Denmark (1,2), Dominican Republic (1), Ecuador (1), Egypt (1,2), 
El Salvador (1), Finland (1,2), France (1,2), Gambia (1), Germany (1,2), Ghana (1,2), Greece 
(1,2), Guatemala (1), Guyana (1), Haiti (1), Honduras (1), India (1,2), Indonesia (1,2), Iran (1), 
Ireland (1), Israel (1,2), Italy (1,2), Jamaica (1,2), Japan (1,2), Jordan (2), Kenya (1,2), Korea 
(1,2), Malta (1), Malawi(1), Malaysia (1,2), Mexico (1,2), Netherlands (1,2), New Zealand (1,2), 
Nicaragua (1), Niger (1), Norway (1,2), Pakistan (1,2), Panama (1), Papua New Guinea (1), 
Paraguay (1), Peru (1,2), Philippines (1,2), Portugal (1,2), Senegal (1), Sierra Leone (1), 
Singapore (2), South Africa (1,2), Spain (1,2), Sri Lanka (1,2), Sudan (1), Sweden (1,2), 
Switzerland (1,2), Syria (1), Thailand (1,2), Togo (1), Trinidad Tobago (1,2), Turkey (2), United 
Kingdom (1,2), United States (1,2), Uruguay (1,2), Venezuela (1,2), Zimbabwe (1,2). 
 
A2.2 Data Sources and Descriptions 
Foreign Direct Investment: The net FDI inflows measure the net inflows of investment to 
acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital,   20 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance 
of payments.  Source: IMF “International Financial Statistics”. 
Output levels and growth: Output level and growth data is the growth of real per capita GDP, 
constant dollars.  Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank (2000). 
Value traded: Value of stock trading relative to the size of the economy.  Source: World 
Bank Financial Structure Database. (http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure 
/database.htm) 
Capitalization:  Captures the size of the stock market, measures the average value of listed 
domestic shares on domestic exchanges in a year as a share of the size of the economy (the GDP).  
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database.                 
Liquidity (LLY):  Liquid Liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest 
bearing liabilities of the financial intermediaries and nonblank financial intermediaries) divided 
by GDP.  Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database. 
Private credit (PRIVCR): The value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP. It excludes credits issued by central and development banks. Furthermore, it 
excludes credit to the public sector and cross claims of one group of intermediaries on another. 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database.  
Bank Credit (BANKCR): Credit by deposit money banks to the private sector as a share of 
GDP. Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database.  
Commercial-Central Bank (BTOT): Ratio of commercial bank domestic assets divided by 
central bank plus commercial bank domestic assets. Source: World Bank Financial Structure 
Database. 
Creditor Rights:  An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is formed by 
adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditor’s consent or minimum 
dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possessions of their 
security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured   21 
creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceed that result form the disposition of the 
assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4. Source: La Porta et 
al. (1997,1998). 
Domestic Investment:  “Gross domestic investment” measuring the outlays on additions to the 
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories.  Source: WDI (2000). 
Inflation:  Percentage changes in the GDP deflator.  Source: WDI (2000). 
Government Consumption: Total expenditure of the central government as a share of GDP. It 
includes both current and capital (development) expenditures and excludes lending minus 
repayments. Sources: WDI (2000). 
Trade Volume:  Exports plus imports as a share of GDP.  Source: WDI (2000). 
Schooling: Human capital measured as the average years of secondary schooling in total 
population.  Source: Barro and Lee (1994). Updated version downloadable from: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
Bureaucratic quality: The institutional strength of the economy. High levels of quality imply 
that the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy, or 
interruption to public services.  Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Risk of expropriation: The probability that the government may expropriate private property.  
Source: ICRG. 
Black market premium: It is calculated as the premium in the parallel exchange market 
relative to the official market (i.e., the formula is (parallel exchange rate/official exchange rate-
1)*100). The values for industrial countries are added as z ero.   Source: World Bank. 
(http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm). 
Real effective exchange rate: Calculated as the ratio of local price index to the multiplication 
of the U.S. price index and the official exchange rate. Source: World Bank. 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ research/growth/GDNdata.htm)   22 
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Countries in this plot are all the 71 countries for which all accompanying data are available and form the 
first sample in Table 2.   27 
 
 
Table 1: FDI Facts 
 
  Value (billion dollars)    Annual Growth 
  1982  1990  1999    86-90  91-95  96-96 
FDI inflows  58  209  865    24  20  32 
FDI inward stock  594  1,761  4,772    18  9  16 
Gross product foreign   
 affiliates 
565  1,419  3,045    16  7  15 
               
Notes:  The data  are  from UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000. UNCTAD defines FDI as an 
investment involving a  long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident 
entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in an economy other that that of the foreign direct investor. 
FDI inflows comprise capital provided by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise. FDI stock is the 
value of the share of the foreign enterprise capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to 
the parent enterprise plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise.  A parent enterprise is 
defined as an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home country, 
usually by owning a certain equity capital stake (10% or more of the equity stake).  A foreign affiliate is an 
incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is resident in another economy, owns a 
stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of the enterprise (an equity stake of 10% for an 
incorporated enterprise or its equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise).  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Sample 1:  71 Countries (1975-95) 
         
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Growth  0.01  0.02  -0.04  0.07 
FDI/GDP  0.01  0.008  -0.001  0.041 
Investment/GDP  0.23  0.06  0.11  0.41 
PRIVCR  0.44  0.34  0.03  1.64 
BANKCR  0.33  0.24  0.03  1.37 
BTOT  0.77  0.19  0.27  0.99 
LLY  0.48  0.28  0.16  1.61 
         
 
Sample 2: 49 countries (1980-95) 
         
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Growth  0.02  0.02  -0.02  0.07 
FDI/GDP  0.012  0.015  0.00  0.10 
Investment/GDP  0.23  0.05  0.12  0.39 
SVALT  0.11  0.21  0.00  1.30 
SCAPT  0.27  0.30  0.01  1.26 
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Table 3:  Growth and FDI 
Dependent Variable—Average annual per capita growth rate 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Period  1975-95  1975-95  1980-95  1980-95 
         
Observations  71  71  49  49 
         
log (Initial GDP)  -0.009  -0.011  -0.007  -0.016 
  (-2.55)  (-3.87)  (-2.80)  (-3.51) 
FDI/GDP  0.16  -0.076  0.347  0.063 
  (0.48)  (-0.25)  (2.31)  (0.27) 
Schooling  0.014  0.011  -0.006  0.0001 
  (3.23)  (2.62)  (-1.41)  (0.02) 
Population Growth  -0.805  -0.192  -0.948  -0.265 
  (-2.51)  (-0.61)  (-3.59)  (-0.91) 
Government Consumption  0.0001  -0.0003  0.008  -0.003 
  (0.02)  (-0.07)  (0.98)  (-0.35) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.007  -0.017  -0.021  -0.021 
  (-1.15)  (-2.63)  (-4.78)  (-3.80) 
Institutional Quality  --  0.005  --  0.011 
  --  (2.62)  --  (2.82) 
Black Market Premium  --  -0.006  --  0.007 
  --  (-1.68)  --  (2.00) 
Inflation  --  -0.018  --  -0.003 
  --  (-1.86)  --  (-0.25) 
Trade Volume  --  0.000005  --  0.008 
  --  (0.000)  --  (1.25) 
         
R
2  0.37  0.59  0.34  0.60 
         
Notes:  All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The first two columns refer to the sample of 
countries for which we have data on Bank Credit (BANKCR), Commercial Bank Assets as a ratio of Total Bank Assets 
(BTOT), Private Credit (PRIVCR), and Liquid Liabilities (LLY). The second two columns refer to the sample of 
countries for which we have data on Stock Market Capitalization (SCAPT) and Stock Market Value Traded (SVALT). 
The Schooling variable is the log of (1+average years of secondary schooling) for the period of the regression. 
Population Growth is the average growth rate for the period. Government Consumption is log(average share of 
government spending/GDP) over the period. Institutional quality is measured by the average risk of expropriations. The 
Black Market Premium is log (1+average BMP) and inflation is log (1+ average inflation rate) for the period. Trade 
Volume is log (average of Exports + Imports as a share of GDP) for the period.   30 
Table 4:  Growth and FDI:  The Role of Financial Markets 
Dependent Variable—Average annual real per capita growth rate 













Period  1975-95  1975-95  1975-95  1975-95  1980-95  1980-95 
             
Observations  71  71  71  71  49  53 
             
log (Initial GDP)  -0.013  -0.012  -0.01 
 
-0.012  -0.017  -0.017 
  (-4.00)  (-3.81)  (-3.18)  (-3.76)  (-3.60)  (-4.22) 
FDI/GDP  0.154  0.917  0.504  0.588  0.121  0.341 
  (0.45)  (2.01)  (1.67)  (1.56)  (0.68)  (1.83) 
(FDI/GDP)*Financ. Markets  0.899  0.893  1.169  0.777  0.335  0.169 
  (1.91)  (2.85)  (3.08)  (2.68)  (2.61)  (1.89) 
Financial Markets  -0.0003  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  0.00007  0.0005 
  (-0.00)  (-1.00)  (-0.77)  (-0.55)  (0.03)  (0.26) 
Schooling  0.012  0.014  0.008  0.009  0.008  0.002 
  (2.85)  (2.49)  (1.92)  (2.15)  (0.15)  (0.51) 
Population Growth  -0.361  -0.149  0.078  -0.146  -0.561  -0.581 
  (-1.24)  (-0.57)  (0.29)  (-0.56)  (-1.70)  (-1.80) 
Government Consumption  0.002  0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.001  0.0004 
  (0.48)  (0.27)  (-0.37)  (0.22)  (-0.15)  (0.06) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.016  -0.02  -0.021  -0.02  -0.025  -0.023 
  (-2.42)  (-3.14)  (-3.25)  (-3.08)  (-5.08)  (-4.83) 
Institutional Quality  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.008  0.009 
  (2.32)  (2.44)  (2.92)  (2.45)  (2.32)  (2.64) 
Black Market Premium  -0.005  -0.007  -0.009  -0.008  0.006  0.008 
  (-0.88)  (-1.80)  (-2.24)  (-1.72)  (2.15)  (2.81) 
Inflation  -0.016  -0.014  -0.011  -0.013  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-1.54)  (-1.36)  (-1.11)  (-1.15)  (-0.33)  (-0.39) 
Trade Volume  0.0002  0.006  -0.0002  0.001  0.008  0.085 
  (0.06)  (0.12)  (-0.06)  (0.20)  (1.27)  (1.56) 
             
R
2  0.62  0.64  0.66  0.64  0.67  0.68 
             




























Notes:  All regressions have a constant term. Heteroscedastic consistent t-values are in parentheses. The financial 
market variable changes with each column. The financial market variables are all logarithms of the actual values. See 
notes to Table 3 for the definitions of remaining variables. The F-statistics test the joint significance of coefficients. 
The F-statistic for financial markets test the null hypothesis that the coefficient for financial market and the interaction 
terms are jointly zero. The F-statistic for FDI tests that the coefficient for FDI and the interaction term are jointly zero. 
The numbers in parentheses below the test statistics indicate the p-values. 
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Table 5a: Net Effects of FDI 
 













Period  1975-95  1975-95  1975-95  1975-95  1980-95  1980-95 
             
Observations  71  71  71  71  49  53 
             
No. of countries that had 
a net positive effect  34  29  19  27  5  13 
No. of countries that had 
a net negative effect  37  42  52  44  44  40 


























Note: See notes to Table 3 for the definitions of variables. 
 
 
Table 5b: Significance of FDI at different Levels of Financial Development 
 













Period  1975-95  1975-95  1975-95  1975-95  1980-95  1980-95 
             
Observations  71  71  71  71  49  53 
             




































Notes: The columns report the t-statistics for the Null Hypothesis that  12 ()0 Finance bb +·=  at different values 
(minimum, mean and maximum) for each financial market variable where 12  and   bb are the coefficients of FDI and 
the interaction term respectively.  
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Table 6:  Growth and FDI—Robustness:  Domestic Investment and Human Capital 
Dependent Variable—Average annual per capita growth rate 



















               
Observations  71  71  71  71  49  53  71 
               
log (Initial GDP)  -0.011  -0.01  -0.009  -0.01  -0.017  -0.017  -.0.01 
  (-4.15)  (-3.55)  (-3.10)  (-3.42)  (-4.36)  (-4.87)  (-3.40) 
Investment/GDP  0.119  0.096  0.069  0.096  0.143  0.128  0.99 
  (4.18)  (3.35)  (1.86)  (3.32)  (3.17)  (3.11)  (3.54) 
FDI/GDP  0.311  1.066  0.501  0.672  0.194  0.352  1.59 
  (1.13)  (2.70)  (1.67)  (2.04)  (1.26)  (2.11)  (2.28) 
(FDI/GDP)*Financ.Markets  1.684  1.059  1.158  0.912  0.241  0.161  1.167 
  (3.74)  (3.49)  (3.22)  (3.19)  (1.86)  (1.94)  (3.75) 
Financial Markets  -0.013  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.001  -0.0009  -0.009 
  (-1.24)  (-1.96)  (-1.55)  (-1.72)  (-0.51)  (-0.52)  (-2.24) 
(FDI/GDP)*Schooling  --  --  --  --  --  --  -0.429 
  --  --  --  --  --  --  (-1.31) 
Schooling  0.01  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.008  0.008  0.012 
  (2.40)  (1.95)  (1.69)  (1.71)  (1.22)  (1.43)  (1.93) 
Population Growth  -0.454  -0.262  -0.045  -0.237  -0.673  -0.681  -0.304 
  (-1.71)  (-0.98)  (-0.14)  (-0.87)  (-2.06)  (-2.23)  (-1.16) 
Government Consumption  0.002  0.0002  -0.002  0.0002  0.004  0.004  -0.0006 
  (0.47)  (0.04)  (-0.46)  (0.04)  (0.59)  (0.58)  (-0.11) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy  -0.014  -0.018  -0.019  -0.018  -0.019  -0.020  -0.015 
  (-2.04)  (-2.81)  (-2.94)  (-2.80)  (-2.82)  (-3.57)  (-2.27) 
Institutional Quality  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.008  0.008  0.004 
  (2.49)  (2.65)  (3.07)  (2.73)  (2.61)  (2.89)  (2.64) 
Black Market Premium  -0.007  -0.008  -0.009  -0.009  0.012  0.012  -0.008 
  (-2.08)  (-2.63)  (-2.24)  (-2.65)  (2.73)  (3.33)  (-2.39) 
Inflation  -0.009  -0.011  -0.012  -0.011  -0.003  -0.003  -0.014 
  (-1.30)  (-1.37)  (-1.45)  (-1.33)  (-0.29)  (-0.37)  (-1.60) 
Trade Volume  -0.0007  -0.0007  -0.001  -0.0006  0.002  0.004  -0.001 
  (-0.17)  (-0.15)  (-0.31)  (-0.13)  (0.46)  (0.089)  (-0.35) 
               
R
2  0.70  0.70  0.68  0.69  0.75  0.75  0.70 
               
Notes:   All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. See notes to Table 3 for definitions of the 
variables.    33 
 Table 7:  Growth and FDI:  The Role of Financial Markets—Endogeneity (IV) 
Dependent Variable—Average annual per capita growth rate 














               
Period  1975-95  1975-95  1980-95  1980-95  1980-95  1980-95  1980-95 
               
Observations  73  73  50  50  36  48  32 
               
log (Initial GDP)  -0.01  -0.013  -0.011  -0.012  -0.013  -0.01  -0.006 
  (-2.58)  (-2.15)  (-1.90)  (-2.16)  (-2.57)  (-2.17)  (-0.82) 
FDI/GDP  2.75  1.585  0.213  0.148  -0.178  0.243  1.525 
  (1.92)  (1.60)  (0.89)  (0.62)  (-0.75)  (0.79)  (1.84) 
(FDI/GDP)*Financ. 
Markets 
2.51  1.918  0.552  0.514  0.441  0.68  1.221 
  (2.04)  (1.85)  (2.47)  (2.41)  (1.77)  (1.69)  (1.89) 
Financial Markets  -0.014  -0.009  -0.0009  0.002  0.011  -0.003  0.001 
  (-0.92)  (-0.50)  (-0.09)  (0.24)  (1.67)  (-0.37)  (0.13) 
Schooling  0.014  0.012  -0.007  -0.002  -0.007  0.001  -0.016 
  (2.66)  (1.99)  (-0.08)  (-0.28)  (-0.71)  (0.10)  (-1.46) 
Population Growth  -0.225  -0.228  -1.108  -1.28  -1.43  -1.00  -1.50 
  (-0.85)  (-0.93)  (-1.55)  (-1.85)  (-1.83)  (-1.69)  (-2.06) 
Government Consumption  0.009  0.007  -0.001  -0.001  0.004  -0.003  0.006 
  (0.85)  (0.73)  (-0.17)  (-0.10)  (0.35)  (-0.31)  (0.52) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dummy 
-0.021  -0.019  -0.02  -0.021  -0.031  -0.02  -0.025 
  (-2.51)  (-2.41)  (-1.88)  (-1.98)  (-4.02)  (-2.13)  (-1.48) 
Black Market Premium  -0.012  -0.013  0.001  0.002  0.01  0.0004  0.005 
  (-2.88)  (-2.63)  (0.26)  (0.51)  (1.30)  (0.09)  (0.49) 
Inflation  -0.011  -0.009  -0.020  -0.014  0.003  -0.025  0.047 
  (-0.60)  (-0.55)  (-0.80)  (-0.57)  (0.15)  (-1.15)  (1.20) 
Trade Volume  0.002  0.003  0.007  0.007  0.011  0.007  -0.005 
  (0.53)  (0.66)  (1.18)  (1.19)  (1.80)  (1.16)  (-0.76) 


















Notes:   All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. See notes to Table 1 for the definitions of 
other variables. In column (1)-(3), the financial sector variables PRIVCR, BANKCR and SCAPT are instrumented by 
the English and Scandinavian legal origin dummy variables. In column (4), the French legal origin variable is added to 
the list of instruments for SCAPT. In column (5), the creditor rights variable is also added to the list of instruments. 
Columns (6) and (7) control for both the endogeneity problem in FDI and in financial market indicators by 
instrumenting FDI with one-period lagged FDI and exchange rate levels respectively and financial markets with the 
LLSV variables used in column (4). The OIR Test reports the Chi-square test statistic for overidentifying restrictions. 
The null hypothesis is that there are no overidentifying restrictions. The terms in parentheses in this row represent the 
p-value.   34 
Endnotes 
                                                                 
1 World Development Report (2000). 
2 See Caves (1996) for a review of the empirical and theoretical literature on multinational 
enterprises. 
3  See Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1995) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1997) for the role 
of technology transfers and market integration in growth. In addition to the technology transfer 
literature, the positive role of FDI has appeared in the broader capital market integration and 
development literature. With particular reference to FDI within the international financial 
integration, Rowland and Tesar (2000) and Hull and Tesar (2000) specifically emphasize that 
multinationals can allow for greater risk diversification.  
4 More recent examples include Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and 
King and Levine (1993b). 
5 To put this in perspective, before Daewoo set up its joint venture, the size of the labor force in 
the garment industry in Bangladesh was only forty. 
6 See Easterly (2001) and Rhee and Belot (1990).  
7 Bangladesh, however, does not rank very well in terms of the financial market indicators that we 
use. At the same time, it is rather well known for micro-credit institutions. 
8 For a theoretical treatment on the ability of FDI to create linkages see Rodriguez-Clare (1996). 
9 See Parikh (1997), page 138. 
10 On Intel in Costa Rica, see Spar (1998), Hanson (2001), Larrain, et al. (2000). On the financing 
issues, see Perez (2000). 
11 The discussions demonstrate how some countries with low absorptive capacities, such as 
Morocco, Uruguay and Venezuela (the last based on Aitken and Harrison, ibid.), failed to reap 
spillovers; whereas Malaysia and Taiwan fared well with higher absorptive capacities. See World 
Bank (2001) page 62.   35 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 A limitation of this definition is that it may overestimate the amount of “new capital” in the 
economy, since it might simply involve a multinational enterprise buying out a local 
manufacturer. Carkovic and Levine (2000) use gross FDI flows instead. However, it is not clear 
to us that outward foreign investment should generate technological spillovers within the source 
economy.  
13 The URL for the database is http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/ 
database.htm. We are grateful to the referee for directing us to this website. 
14 In keeping with the literature, we use the logarithm of the financial sector variables. 
15 For Value Traded, we have data on 53 countries;  for Capitalization we have data on 49 
countries. The four countries for which we do not have data for the latter variable are Costa Rica, 
Ireland, Honduras, and Panama. 
16 We used the updated data available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. 
17 Here OECD countries refer to those that were “early” members and therefore exclude newer 
members, such as Mexico and Korea among others. For Value Traded, we also have Ireland in 
the sample, taking the number of OECD countries to 21. 
18 Further, to ensure comparability, we include a number or controls that are present in Beck et 
al., Levine et al. (2000), and Carkovic and Levine (2000).  
19 We repeated these regressions by adding the financial market variables as well. Although these 
variables were significant and positive, they did not alter the insignificance of FDI.  
20 See the data section for detailed definitions. 
21 The literature that tests the effects of financial development on growth has not considered FDI 
and its interaction term with financial markets, thus limiting comparisons.   
22 The mean value for FDI is 1.003% in the 71-country sample. Note that the financial 
development variable here is the log of the financial market indicator.   36 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
23 The net effect being measured here is  2log()3log() () iprivcrprivcr meanFDI bsbs ··+ . Here mean 
FDI is 1.003% as mentioned in the earlier footnote.  ) log(privcr s is the standard deviation of log 
PRIVCR and is equal to 0.78. 
24 Again, note that the financial market variable is a logarithm of the actual indicator and hence is 
negative for any country with a value less than 1 (i.e. less than 100% of GDP). The net effect of 
FDI on growth is equal to 12 (log()) iii FDIFDIFinance bb ·+·· . Therefore, even if the 
estimated coefficients are positive, the net effect may still be negative if log (financei) is 
sufficiently negative. 
25 Borenzstein et al. (1998) suggest a similar possibility for the interaction with human capital. 
26 In initial stages of our research, we found that the introduction of domestic investment made 
FDI insignificant. We further found that this could be explained by the fact that both types of 
investment were highly correlated, and FDI seemed to be a significant determinant of domestic 
investment. However, with the current expanded sample, as noted above, we find that FDI can 
have significant positive effects on growth even when controlling for domestic investment. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence that the two types of investment are correlated any longer. 
27 See Borenzstein et al. (1998) and Xu (2000). 
28   We experimented with using at least three legal origin variables as instruments for each of the 
financial market variables. It was only in the case of SCAPT that the null hypothesis of no 
overidentifying restrictions was not rejected. Further, the sample correlation between English and 
the French legal origins was approximately -0.8 making it difficult to enter both simultaneously 
as instruments. In addition the first stage regressions where we use French and English dummies 
in the same regression with another dummy do not provide a good fit. 
29 Markusen and Maskus (1999) use different FDI d eterminants,  such as  lagged FDI, to 
discriminate among alternative FDI theories.  Borensztein et al. (1998) used these variables as 
instruments for FDI in their work.  